IV. Market-Oriented Planning Of Type 2 - Developer-Driven Planning With State Support
The most extreme contrast to the ideal type of strong local government planning can be found in the early stages of the Thatcher period in the United Kingdom. See, for example, Thornley (1993), Harding, Wilks-Heeg, and Hutchins (2000), and Allmendinger and Tewdwr-Jones (2000). The formation of Urban Development Corporations (UDCs) meant that, in designated areas within a city, the local government lost its legal rights to determine land-use. The proposals of the UDCs only had to be approved by the central government. As business interests dominated the UDCs, the vision for the future of the area was formulated completely outside the sphere of the local government. Harding, Wilks-Heeg & Hutchins (2000, p. 980) write:
This type of market-oriented planning will be called "Thatcher Style," and its characteristics are summarised in Table 3 below. The financial position of the local government isn´t so important in this case as it has lost control over the area in question.
TABLE 3: Market-oriented Planning: Type 2 - Thatcher Style
This type of market-oriented planning can be compared to what has been called "trend planning," which Mäntysalo (1999, p.183, p. 185) describes in the following way.
However, nothing in the definition of Thatcher Style planning says that local government planners need to be involved in the kind of "essentially aesthetic control" that Mäntysalo discusses. My impression is that the private investors were very interested also in controlling design issues as these could affect the attractiveness and profitability of the projects. This also seemed to be the case in Nordic Style market-oriented planning discussed in the last section.
Allmendinger and Tewdwr-Jones (2000) make a number of observations that indicate that this type of market-oriented planning can be dynamically inconsistent: It can perhaps only be applied for a short period of time and after that it will break down.The basic reason for this is that the external investors that dominate an Urban Development Corporation will turn into owners of locally bound capital when the project is completed. To protect their investments, the private investors might want to return authority to the local arena. A new UDC that only needs approval of the central government can plan in a way that negatively affects existing areas, perhaps just by increasing supply and competition on the real estate market. The old investors might therefore support proposals that increase the power of the local government, if the investors believe that it is easier for them to affect local decisions. Even a strong right-wing government like the Thatcher government chose to give back powers to the local governments after a number of years. Fischel (2000, p. 405) notes the following in the context of American planning, and this strengthens the idea that it is difficult to reduce local power over planning.